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Introduction 
This essay concerns energy security, or more specifically energy insecurity, in Central and South-
Eastern Europe. Insecurity can be defined as a situation in which vulnerability from a particular 
danger or threat is perceived to exist. Threats generally come from external sources, but can also 
come from within, and usually have an existential quality. Energy is existential in that it underpins 
modern life—we use it to provide power, heat and light to our homes, workplaces and cities; to fuel 
our cars and other forms of transport; to help produce and power technology; and even to help us 
grow and process the food we eat. Energy is a critical resource and as such it is a commodity of 
significant strategic importance, particularly with regard to access. The main concern that has driven 
the rise of energy insecurity has been ‘security of supply’. This refers to the ability of states and other 
users to guarantee sources of affordable energy, sufficient to meet their needs across all economic and 
business, societal and even politico-military activities. Energy insecurity exists when internal actions, 
those by third parties, or even natural disasters, threaten to, or actually do, disrupt access to the supply 
or affordability of energy.  
Energy insecurity is not unique to Central and South-Eastern Europe. The region shares many 
concerns with other parts of Europe and states across the globe. However, because of the historic 
legacies of the region’s communist past, some of the vulnerabilities and threats it faces are more 
pronounced. For example, the region is highly dependent on imports of fossil fuels such as petroleum 
and natural gas, with some states importing as much as 60%–100% of their needs from a single 
supplier, the Russian Federation. (Other than Romania, nearly all Central and South-Eastern European 
states are dependent on natural gas imports, with almost 100% of requirements imported by Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav 
republic of Macedonia—FYRM, Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.) Monopolization of the 
market by Russia, as the primary supplier, means that long-term bilateral export-import contracts tend 
to be less favourably priced, resulting in higher energy costs. The mix of energy types used by states 
in the region is considered to be less diverse than in Western Europe, meaning that any disruption to 
their primary energy type could be problematic. This is especially so when it is acknowledged that the 
region’s import infrastructure is dominated by static pipelines built during the Soviet era and that 
integration with Western European infrastructure is limited. Without suitable alternative energy 
access or adequate storage any problem with the pipelines, or with the source of gas (or oil) entering 
the pipeline system, can have serious consequences for import dependent states. 
The importance of pipelines cannot be underestimated. They have provided the Central and South-
Eastern European region access to oil and gas for decades, and this has determined how the region 
accesses much of its energy needs. Until recently, the situation was more problematic for natural gas 
because the expense and lack of technical capability to liquefy and regasify natural gas meant that its 
transportation was only realistically capable via pipelines. Since, as a liquid, oil could be transported 
via tankers, oil pipelines were not as critical, although they remain by far the cheapest and quickest 
means to transport oil, and the most suitable for some of the region’s landlocked states. As a result of 
these issues, Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered to be the most vulnerable region of 
Europe with regard to energy security. Even those states with substantial domestic energy sources, 
such as Poland (coal and lignite), have become increasingly reliant on imports of low-carbon fuels 
like natural gas, as they seek to meet the strict climate change targets introduced by the European 
Union (EU) for the reduction of CO2 emissions. Much of this natural gas has also been imported by 
pipelines. In order to better understand how pipeline politics plays a role in creating challenges and 
vulnerabilities for Central and South-Eastern Europe’s energy security, as well as informing policy 
solutions, we need to consider the region’s relations with its primary and potential energy suppliers, 
such as Russia, and with its partners in the wider EU.  
 
Energy and the EU 
In Europe, until recently, there has been a growing demand for energy. It is considered that energy 
consumption levels within the EU peaked around 2005 (when gross inland energy consumption 
reached 1,824.7m. metric tons of oil equivalent, according to Eurostat figures, compared with 
1,671.1m. tons in 1995 and 1,666.3m. tons in 2013), and improved efficiency of energy use is 
predicted to result in further reductions in energy consumption over the coming years. Interestingly, in 
comparison with the EU as a whole, energy consumption levels of the Central European states peaked 
much earlier than their Western counterparts. By 2035 domestic production of primary fossil fuels is 
also predicted to fall, oil by 57%, coal by 49% and natural gas by 46%. This would cancel out the 
predicted decline in consumption levels. As a result, it is assumed that energy imports will remain 
constant at around 55%, of which natural gas imports will increase by around 49%. This means that 
the EU is likely to remain the world’s largest net importer of natural gas. It is important to note, 
however, that the levels of imports are not balanced across all the EU member states, and some 
countries import much more than others that have domestic resources available. 
Overall, the EU imports around 60% of the gas it uses and 80% of the crude oil. The majority of these 
imports come from a small group of states, the Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria, and because 
of the nature of the EU’s infrastructure and geographic proximity these supplier states tend to direct 
their products to clusters of EU members. As already mentioned, the Central and South-Eastern 
European states are predominately supplied by Russia. When energy imports are concentrated among 
a few supplier states, there is an increased risk of vulnerability should external matters result in 
disruption to supply and sufficient alternative mechanisms to counter that disruption are not in place. 
For a number of Central and South-Eastern European states this is exactly what happened in 2006, 
and again in 2009, when Russia suspended gas sales to Ukraine. This was problematic because 
Ukraine provides one of the primary transit routes for Russian gas imports. These two Russia–Ukraine 
gas crises, and the fact that the majority of Central and South-Eastern European states are now 
members of the EU, is often used to explain why the EU has become more involved in energy matters 
and why energy has increasingly become an area of integration activity at the European level.  
The issues are a little more complex, however. Energy has always been important for the European 
integration project, from its foundation as the European Coal and Steel Community, through Euratom 
to the European Energy Charter Treaty, the European Energy Community, and to the most recent 
development, the European Energy Union. There have always been ebbs and flows in the intensity of 
policy development, but since the 1990s and early 2000s interest in energy has grown significantly at 
the European level. Import dependency has not been the only factor behind this rapid expansion of 
energy interests. The promotion of market liberalization and growing concern for environmental 
matters and climate change have also been hugely important. This tripartite justification for the 
increased interest in energy can also be used to explain the EU’s securitization of energy. It is 
necessary to recognize that there has also been a fluctuating hierarchy of importance across these 
three drivers. 
In the early 2000s it was very much the last two factors (market liberalization and the climate agenda) 
that were most significant. Questions about supply did exist, but it is important to note that they 
tended to be framed in the context of market forces, and were about ensuring affordable supplies and 
improving the connectivity of market infrastructure to ensure regular supplies at reasonable prices 
amid growing demand. Diversification of suppliers was primarily about opening the market to 
competitive forces and preventing monopolistic pricing structures. This is not to say that questions 
over transit routes or reliability of suppliers were not a concern, rather that they were not the priority. 
Fears about unreliable suppliers ‘turning off the tap’ were not on the agenda, and Russia was more or 
less regarded as a safe and secure supply partner. 
Central and South-Eastern European states fell in line with this general EU position and this was 
evident in the language they used at the time. Acutely aware of energy challenges primarily stemming 
from their time under communist regimes, and in advance of their accession to the EU, the Central 
European states initiated co-operative efforts to support their integration into the wider European 
energy market. For example, in 2002 the Visegrad Group (V4), under the presidency of Hungary, 
initiated the V4 Energy Working Group to support the ministries of economy in the V4 states with the 
improvement of co-operation across the energy sector. The main purpose was to improve information 
exchange in support of market liberalization across the region, speed up privatization strategies, and 
ensure the maintenance and expansion of storage facilities—all demands of the EU for the Central 
European candidate states. Improved interconnections with Western Europe were also recognized as 
necessary to support market integration.  
Diversification away from Russian supplies was not considered a rationale for this type of co-
operation. When diversification was mentioned it was viewed as ‘in addition to’, rather than ‘instead 
of’, Russian supplies. It was about choice and price. As the then Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány stated, ‘Mad would be the country which was happy about depending on a single supplier 
for the purchase of a strategically important service and product’, thus highlighting the fact that 
replacing Russia as a single supplier with an alternative would not resolve the fundamental challenges 
informing energy insecurity. This could be recognized when proposals were put forward in 2002 for a 
major new pipeline that was intended to open up the European market to natural gas from the Caspian 
and Central Asia regions. The consortium behind this project, which become known as the Nabucco 
Pipeline, initially involved Austria and Turkey, but quickly included Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, 
demonstrating the importance of these countries as transit states for the new pipeline and the 
opportunity for them to benefit from access to the piped gas. All three states are highly dependent on 
Russia for their gas imports and at the time paid a premium price via take-or-pay contracts with 
Russia. Having additional sources of gas imports would potentially give these states increased 
leverage in any future gas contract negotiations. 
 
The Emergence of Pipeline politics: Nabucco versus South Stream 
Nabucco was developed in response to the discovery of the Shah Deniz (Şah Deniz) gasfield in the 
Caspian Sea in 1999. Comprising some 330 sq miles, Shah Deniz is one of the largest oil- and 
gasfields to be discovered in recent years, and it began production in 2006. Nabucco was intended to 
provide transit of natural gas from this field to Europe and was at first considered a commercial 
venture, but it was not long before the project took on a political undertone, although for the Russian 
Federation it always held political connotations.  
The Nabucco project was problematic for Russia because it threatened its effective monopoly on gas 
imports to Europe, specifically Central and South-Eastern Europe. It is not to Russia’s advantage if 
that region, as Russia’s largest customer, has alternative suppliers, thus providing an opportunity to 
bargain on price. For Europe this is exactly what Nabucco was intended to achieve: to increase 
competition and reduce prices. For the EU and its member states two occurrences served to alter their 
position towards Nabucco and shift it from being a predominately commercial venture to a political 
one. 
The first of these was the first Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2006, in which disagreement over the 
price of gas to be paid by Ukraine resulted in the suspension of gas flows from Russia to Ukraine for 
four days. As Ukraine is the major transit route for gas destined for the European markets, the 
disruption to levels of gas, exacerbated by Ukraine allegedly siphoning gas intended for European 
markets, resulted in a significant decline in supplies. For some Central European states this was a 
serious problem. It highlighted their failure to ensure adequate stored gas supplies and emphasized 
their over-reliance on Russia as single supplier. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of Russia as a 
supplier and Ukraine as a transit state, which had previously been accepted, was called into question 
in a way it never had been before.  
The second matter was the emergence of alternative competitor pipeline projects promoted by Russia. 
Initially, Russia had suggested an extension of its Blue Stream gas pipeline via Turkey as a way to 
provide an additional access point for Russian gas into Europe. It eventually decided against this, and 
in 2007 it announced the South Stream project, which entailed the construction of a pipeline under the 
Black Sea, and through Bulgaria, Serbia and into Hungary, with the aim of supplying Europe with 
some 63,000m. cu m of gas per year. For Russia, the purpose of South Stream was twofold: first, it 
sought to reinforce Russia’s dominate position as the primary gas supplier to Central and South-
Eastern Europe, and open up possible new opportunities by providing Russia with a southern access 
point to its European markets without the need to transit Ukraine. This would be a good fit with the 
parallel proposed Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would directly link Russia to 
Germany, and provide some 55,000m. cu m of natural gas per year. By establishing both these 
projects, Russia was essentially claiming that it could remain a viable and reliable partner by 
providing new transit routes. In so doing, it effectively sought to accuse Ukraine of responsibility for 
problems with natural gas transit to the EU. Second, South Stream allowed Russia to present a project 
as a direct rival to Nabucco and seek to prevent its monopoly on gas supplies from being eroded too 
quickly. Russia claimed that South Stream would be more competitive and less expensive to build. It 
also created uncertainty for possible investors because it raised questions about the sustainability of 
two competing pipelines.  
Russia failed to convince many in Europe that it could be trusted, and rhetoric which made reference 
to energy as a foreign policy tool, as well as some of the actions undertaken by Russia towards 
energy-importing and transit states, fuelled the rise of a discourse in Western political, academic and 
media circles emphasizing ‘the new Cold War’, ‘energy wars’ and ‘energy weapon’. Energy had 
become highly political. In the southern corridor space, the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline 
projects were suddenly framed as Europe versus Russia, thus emphasizing political tensions. 
Inevitably, it was less straightforward than this, because principal EU member and candidate states 
from Central and South-Eastern Europe were partners in both projects, thus adding to the complexity 
of the situation. 
None the less, what became apparent in Europe during this time is a clear shift in the framing of 
energy as a security concern, with pipeline politics perceived as a crucial element in this development. 
A second Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2008–09 reinforced this concern about security of supply for 
Europe and specifically for the Central and South-Eastern European states. However, the ultimate 
success of this securitization of pipelines within the wider energy security discourse is questionable. 
Nabucco was prioritized as a high-level European project with a clear political and security rationale, 
and was supported by the EU and the USA. The reason it became so politicized was in part a result of 
the need to secure political backing and justification for funding support. This was coupled with its 
identification as a possible signature project by the European Commission, which was seeking to 
develop its energy policy competencies, both internally and externally. The Russian–Ukrainian gas 
crises, the urgency to diversify supplies, and growing concern about Russian use of energy and 
pipelines as foreign policy tools, allowed the project to be securitized as a means to introduce 
alternative suppliers, break the Russian monopoly and ultimately curtail Russia’s ability to use energy 
for political means. The securitization of the Nabucco pipeline project effectively prolonged its 
existence in a way that standard commercial projects would not have been able to do. Despite this 
apparent wealth of political support, commercial viability remained fundamental, and no matter how 
much political backing the project received, if it proved financially unfeasible it would be unable to 
progress. This is exactly what happened, and Nabucco effectively stagnated as a project. Strangely, 
this outcome was widely predicted, yet there seemed to be a form of collective denial, and whenever 
any party, such as some of the more frustrated Central European states, did suggest that the project 
was not likely to come to fruition, they were castigated and shamed as being anti-European, or 
insufficiently supportive of energy solidarity in Europe. 
 
Pipeline Politics: Economic versus Political Rationales 
The need for projects to have commercial viability resulted in other competitor pipeline projects 
emerging to challenge both Nabucco and South Stream. The most significant of these was the 
Azerbaijani- and Turkish-owned Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which was 
announced in 2011 and would effectively replace the need for much of the Turkish section of the 
original Nabucco project. This forced the Nabucco consortium to re-evaluate their proposal. The 
rebranding of Nabucco as ‘Nabucco West’ reflected the truncation of the project as a spur pipeline 
from TANAP through Central and South-Eastern Europe. This revised project looked more 
achievable and even economically viable, but the ongoing economic crisis and the investment of the 
State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) in Greece, where it purchased 66% of the 
Greek Transmission Network Operator in 2013, may have had an influence on a 2013 decision by the 
SOCAR-led Shah Deniz consortium to award a contract for the transit of TANAP gas to the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), rather than to Nabucco West. TAP had initially been proposed as early as 
2003 as a pipeline to be constructed through Greece and Albania to Italy, and following the award of 
the contract, the TANAP consortium purchased shares in TAP, reinforcing it as the official extension 
of TANAP in Europe. TAP had been placed in direct competition with Nabucco West, which was to 
run further north, as the primary route for the European section of the southern energy corridor. 
The politics held by the Central and South-Eastern European states and the EU that drove the need for 
Nabucco were not shared by Azerbaijan and its Shah Deniz-TANAP partners; thus it was not 
surprising that a more modest project with a seemingly higher investment return was selected. This 
leads to questions concerning the relationship between commercial activity and political requirements. 
If something is so important that it warrants the type of prioritization that Nabucco received, then it 
has to be supported by relevant financial investment for political means. This did not happen for 
Nabucco, which was predicated by the need to adhere to market-led forces. Political neutrality is 
required if the market is to operate as it should. Herein lies the paradox: that energy policy cannot be 
politically neutral. European states know this, as does the EU, and when the market is allowed to take 
precedence, it will adversely affect the ability of states to ensure that large infrastructure projects of 
strategic (if not commercial) importance are fulfilled. This is one of the significant challenges for 
Europe and for the Central and South-Eastern European states that need improved infrastructure but 
are unable always to rely on the market providing it. How can the economics be balanced with the 
politics? 
 
The Problem of South Stream 
The failure of Nabucco West to win the Shah Deniz contract effectively meant that the project became 
untenable. As a consequence, in order for the southern gas corridor to reach Central and South-
Eastern Europe the possible options were either a secondary spur from TAP, perhaps into Bulgaria, or 
Russia’s South Stream project.  
Though a Russian project, South Stream had the support of a number of Central and South-Eastern 
European states, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, the FYRM and Serbia, as well as Italy 
and Austria. This demonstrates the fact that Russia remains an important strategic partner for these 
states within the energy sector. Each of these states had signed contracts with Russia to complete the 
various primary and secondary parts of the pipeline along its European section. Despite the 
enthusiasm of the Central and South-Eastern European states for South Stream, the project 
encountered a number of challenges. These included accusations from the European Commission in 
December 2013 that the contracts signed between Russia and the EU states, including Serbia (which 
is a candidate country for EU membership and a member of the European Energy Community), were 
in violation of the EU’s Third Energy Package regulations concerning ownership of pipelines by 
natural gas extractors and the right for third party access to the pipeline. In June 2014 the project was 
effectively halted, owing to a European Commission infringement procedure against Bulgaria 
concerning non-compliance with EU procurement requirements. Bulgaria had also been threatened 
with possible sanctions by the USA, owing to the participation of Russian company Stroytransgaz in 
the consortium awarded the contract to build the Bulgarian section. At the same time, as for Nabucco 
previously, there were questions over the financial viability of the project. Competition from other 
energy projects and sectors (such as the increased adoption and affordability of liquefied natural 
gas—LNG) was creating a more challenging environment where long-term contracts and fixed 
pipelines become expensive and inflexible. Ongoing political tension owing to conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, following the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea by Russia in March, and the 
imposition of Western sanctions on Russia, also had a negative impact on the project, and in 
December Russia announced that it was to abandon South Stream in favour of a new pipeline project 
to be developed in co-operation with Turkey. The new TurkStream pipeline was proposed within the 
framework of the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation. However, the November 2015 Turkish military downing of a Russian fighter jet along 
the Turkey-Syria border and subsequent imposition of Russian sanctions against Turkey which 
included the suspension of the intergovernmental commission meant that in effect TurkStream was 
also suspended. It is not clear if there were other economic rationales for the quick move by Russia to 
effectively abandon this project, but it does highlight how geopolitics and energy supply can intersect.   
 
Implications for Central and South-Eastern Europe 
The cancellation of both Nabucco, South Stream and latterly TurkStream has had significant 
implications for Central and South-Eastern Europe within the context of the southern energy corridor. 
First, it highlights that their perceived energy needs, even when framed in strong security terms, are 
not strong enough to override financial realities. Economics takes precedence over politics. It also 
confirms that this part of Europe is likely to remain reliant on the Russian Federation, and that routes 
via Ukraine are likely to continue to be important for the foreseeable future unless possible new, land-
based routes such as the spurs from TAP are developed, or one of the currently defunct proposals is 
reactivated.  
When considered in terms of diversification of supply and access to new sources of gas, this is 
potentially problematic for the region; however, it has also compelled the Central and South-Eastern 
European states carefully to consider new responses to their energy insecurity in a post-Nabucco and 
post-South Stream context. 
The governments of Central and South-Eastern European states have been astute, understanding that 
their energy security could never be entirely reliant on the southern corridor pipeline projects. Those 
projects, if they had come to fruition, might have given some long-term stability of supply, but they 
would not have resolved the other major problems they face in terms of energy insecurity—
specifically their integration into the wider EU energy infrastructure. A north–south corridor had been 
identified as a major missing link in this infrastructure allowing connection of various energy systems 
(gas, oil and electricity grids) from the Adriatic in the south to the Baltic in the north. With the demise 
of the large project for a southern corridor (not taking TAP into account), this north–south corridor 
has become even more essential and specific Projects of Common Interest (PCI) have been agreed at 
the EU level. Many of these PCIs will feed into the broader conceptualisation of regional energy 
frameworks. For example, the concept of north–south has been extended to what the EU now terms 
North-South East, where the promotion of a series of smaller energy infrastructure PCIs would allow 
the development of a ring-road connecting the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. This would be 
achieved by investing in existing infrastructure and building reverse-flow interconnectors between 
states across the region. The Central European states have been promoting this idea for some time, but 
until recently it has always taken second priority to the large pipeline projects. As it turns out, it may 
take a more significant and relevant role in supporting the development of energy security for the 
region. The fact that these interconnectors allow reverse flow should also provide for a sharing of gas 
resources in times of stress. 
The financing of these small-scale projects has also been problematic, and the Central and South-
Eastern European states have looked towards the EU for financial support. The EU recognizes that 
there are occasions when such projects need financial support and, to its credit, it has been more 
supportive of this type of project because they can be delivered faster and cheaper than the ‘grand 
pipeline projects’ such as Nabucco. The need to ensure improved infrastructure is also important 
because it allows the region to benefit from LNG as an alternative supply piped gas. The Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are a good example of a former ‘energy island’ region that has sought 
to use LNG as a means to provide access to gas from other suppliers. There have, of course, been 
problems in agreeing the location of LNG terminals in the Baltic region, emphasizing the fact that 
states continue to perceive great benefit in being the host of energy facilities. For Central and South-
Eastern Europe, a new LNG terminal has entered into operation in Poland and another is planned in 
Croatia. The Croatian terminal is proving problematic in terms of the speed of its planning, with 
feasibility studies only being carried out in 2015, despite the proposal for a terminal having been 
under consideration for a quite substantial period of time. The plan is that the two terminals in Poland 
and Croatia will be connected by 2020, allowing the so-called north–south corridor to be completed. 
Another way that the Central European states have sought to improve their position has been through 
increased gas storage. Most of the states in the region learned a harsh lesson from previous Russia–
Ukrainian gas crises, and the concern about a possible reduction in supplies following the annexation 
of Crimea appeared to justify the efforts to increase storage for critical points of the year. All states in 
the region successfully coped with a simulated stress test on their gas supplies undertaken by the 
European Commission in 2014 and suggestions stemming directly from that exercise, stating that 
improvements to regional infrastructure should be completed faster, led to the establishment of the so-
called Central East South Europe Gas Connectivity High Level Group, which first met in February 
2015. 
 
The Return of Pipeline Politics 
The southern energy corridor has without doubt been the scene of some of the more complicated 
pipeline projects directly impacting the Central and South-Eastern European states. It is, however, not 
the only field of pipeline activity with bearing on the energy concerns of these states. The Baltic Sea 
is the location of the Russian and German backed Nord Stream pipeline. Becoming operational in 
2011, Nord Stream was from its incorporation in 2005 every bit as controversial as the pipelines 
planned in the south. Acting as an alternative transit route for Russian gas into Western Europe, Nord 
Stream wou ld bypass traditional transit states including Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia and 
Czech Republic. This raised considerable concern about the possible loss of transit fees should gas be 
diverted away from traditional routes. Other concerns that were raised included those focusing on the 
ecological environment of the Baltic Sea, security issues with respect to the use of the Russian Baltic 
Fleet for protection of the pipeline, and access to polish ports.  
Unlike Russia’s South Stream pipeline, Nord Stream was completed on schedule and its dual 
pipelines now connect Russia directly with Germany, although, it currently only operates at half 
capacity (27.5 billion cu m) due to the EU’s Third Energy Package third-party access requirements 
which restrict Gazprom’s access to the Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung (or OPAL Pipeline) 
connecting Nord Stream with the Czech Republic.  Despite this, Russia, recognising that this route 
has been its only pipeline success story in recent years, has identified the route as suitable for 
expansion and has proposed the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. Doubling operational capacity from 
55billion cu m to 110 billion cu m, this would enable Russia to fulfil its policy of transit avoidance 
and potentially bypass Ukraine for most of its natural gas exports to the EU. The Russian-Ukraine 
conflict and the January 2016 decision by Ukraine’s Naftogaz to increase transit fees for Russian gas 
by 50% has reinforced the potential benefit of Nord Stream 2 for Russia. The suspension of 
TurkStream also makes Nord Stream II even more important as it will be the only alternative new 
transit route available to Russia.  
While there may be economic or commercial rationales for Russia and its western energy company 
partners (Uniper, OMV, Shell, Wintershall and ENGIE) to promote Nord Stream 2, it is impossible to 
deny the fact that many countries will also see political rationales.  As the president of Lithuania, 
Dalia Grybauskaite expressed: “It is highly regrettable that our big partners (in Europe) are trying to 
explain to the EU member states that it [Nord Stream 2] is only a private commercial project. We all 
are very well aware that all energy projects of this scale are geopolitical, and their goals are precisely 
geopolitical”. It was this position that was set forth in a joint letter sent in March 2016 by nine EU 
member states from the Central and South-Eastern European region (Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania) to Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the European Commission. They argued that the pipeline fails to reflect the EU’s 
intention, underpinned by the strategy set out by the European Energy Union, to diversify energy 
sources and therefore poses “risks for energy security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, 
which is still highly dependent on a single source of energy”. Nord Stream 2 would reinforce 
European reliance on Russian energy sources and have economic implications for those states still 
reliant on transit fees, specifically Ukraine and Slovakia. It has also been suggested that the relevant 
strength of countries and big corporations vis-à-vis which pipeline projects are successful, highlights a 
difference between the north and the south of Europe with projects like Nabucco or South Stream 
failing to be taken seriously because of the limited influence of those countries backing them. The 
geopolitics of the project is creating a rather acrimonious situation pitting the European Parliament, 
the European Commission and key member states of the EU as well as Russia against each other.   
Conclusion 
Amid the collapse of the large-scale pipeline projects designed to address the energy insecurity of 
Central and South-Eastern Europe, smaller practical solutions have appeared to allow the region to 
respond more effectively and quickly. They are more easily financed and can be completed in a more 
manageable timeframe. As such, they perhaps suggest that the large pipeline projects are not always 
the best solution to energy insecurity and can actually increase that insecurity.  This is certainly the 
case with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project which highlights that for some players, specifically 
energy providers such as Russia, pipelines still have value, but at they can come at a cost for others.  
Does this mean that the issue of pipeline politics and energy security has been overplayed in Europe? 
On the one hand, yes, perhaps it has. Enmeshed in a cycle of geopolitical power play, it is easy to 
overemphasize the security threat to Europe’s energy, but, in reality, Europe and the Central and 
South-Eastern European region have been able to respond and develop alternative solutions to the 
challenges they face.   However, there is more to this story concerning the EU, its member states and 
its neighbours. Energy will remain one of the areas in which politics continues to be played out, and 
this has an adverse impact on the ability of the EU to present a united front. The South Stream project 
clearly demonstrated that EU member states do not necessarily all agree with each other about how 
certain energy projects should evolve. South Stream, prior to its cancellation, proved to represent a 
real dividing line between EU institutions such as the European Commission and some of the Central 
and South-Eastern European states—specifically Hungary and Bulgaria. The differences of opinion 
between Central and South-Eastern European EU member states and Germany with regard to Nord 
Stream 2 reflect similar concerns. Member states rhetoric regularly spills out into the forums provided 
by the EU institutions and these same institutions increasing have their own positions to put forward. 
This raises questions about concepts such as energy solidarity in Europe and the commitment of 
member states to abide by the EU’s market regulations in the field of energy. Therefore, it will be 
interesting to see how the EU’s European Energy Union, which was launched in February 2015, 
responses to large-scale controversial and contested pipeline projects. The Energy Union is intended 
to strengthen the EU’s role in negotiating on behalf of its members, and to improve the solidarity 
concept and promote the free movement of energy through a completely integrated and liberalized 
market as a fifth freedom, alongside the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, and 
the rights to free movement of goods, workers and capital. Although this should improve the ability of 
the EU and its member states to engage with Russia and other large suppliers, it is also likely to face 
challenges in doing so if it does not have the backing of all of its members. 
Although as stated at the beginning of this essay, Central and South-Eastern Europe is considered to 
be the most vulnerable region in Europe for energy insecurity, the reality is that the level of insecurity 
may be overemphasized. Certainly, the region has encountered clear problems and the geopolitical 
and geoeconomic gameplay surrounding large-scale pipeline projects has not helped to lessen that 
insecurity. The role of pipeline politics is also unlikely to diminish while pipeline projects remain the 
most beneficial approach for suppliers. However, the use of alternative technologies, including LNG 
and renewables, as well as promoting smaller pipeline interconnector projects and overall greater 
regional co-operation, has had a positive impact on the region’s ability to address some of its energy 
security challenges. Differences of opinion and policy preferences do remain and national self-interest 
may still challenge a common European position, but it is unlikely that the region will in the future 
face the same level of energy insecurity that it experienced during the Russia–Ukraine energy crises 
of 2006 and 2009. 
 
